The Diminished Value of Barbarian Lives by Romans
The relationship between Romans and their neighbours, or "barbarians" as the Romans called them, is a complicated one, and one that went through an impressive evolution. One event in particular, however, changed the course of the Roman world in the scope of foreign relations, an event that impacted how the Romans perceived and treated those around them, and how they conducted themselves: The Gallic sack of Rome in 390 BCE. This event seems to have caused a chain reaction across their timeline that develops into a defensive imperialism mindset, or a pre-emptive strike mindset. Through this characterization of other groups and acting out of fear, the Romans were aggressive and sought to eliminate threats before they existed. It is a paranoid outlook, and they created many enemies with this ideology. (Mathisen, 105) When Rome defeated enemies, they formed forced alliances and were thus able to draw military support from said defeated enemies. This treatment of using people as a means to an end is problematic, and further, the fact that they would conquer people, and then use conquered people to conquer more people just to prevent a potential threat in other would-be conquerors, well, when looked at it this way, seems obsessive, illogical, and entirely fear-based. The Gallic sack unhinged Roman strength in more ways than one, and it is seen in military operation, and in the treatment of people in general. Through the constant conquering of people, Rome also developed a superiority complex along with a sense of invincibility by later years, and in combination with subjugating everyone around them because they had power, Rome almost became a personality in itself.
The Romans interacted with every single group around them, slowly conquering and adding them to their own ranks through alliances and extended citizenship. Throughout Rome's history, we see further interactions with Gauls, and additionally with Etruscans, Greeks, Macedonians, Samnites, Illyrians, and Carthaginians or Phoenicians, all of whom are eventually conquered and assimilated by Rome, apart from the Carthaginians who were utterly destroyed. The distinction between "Roman" and "non-Roman" can prove murky at times. Some groups were more palatable to the Romans, and through assimilation, it became an issue more about citizenship than of race when defining "Roman" versus non. In the beginning, being Roman had everything to do with lineage and family lines, Patrician versus Plebeian as an example, but that idea quickly dissolved as the republic came to a close.
Backing up to the Regal period, I believe there was an unfortunate bridge made between Etruscan and "other", particularly due to the memory of the Etruscan Kings and the last king in particular, Tarquin the Proud (Mathisen, 66-67). Although there is very little evidence from the Regal period, it is clear Rome believed the events, and the negative connotation of "King" remained for the rest of the Roman timeline (Mathisen, 73, source 2.3). The Romans seem to take things extremely personally, and even unconsciously, there may have been a sense of distrust in the "other" because of a couple of singular instances of being mistreated. This could also be a possible reason for the Roman superiority complex, as the republic was literally based on the idea of "overthrowing the Etruscans" because they were "bad". It can be too easy to unjustly generalize an entire group based on the actions of a few, and although I am not proposing this is the case, I think it is possible there was an element of this sort of judgement.
The Gallic sack of Rome in 390 BCE had a severe impact on the Roman psyche as well, which does not help their relationship with "others".
"The Roman army [...] was completely flabbergasted by the horrifying, undisciplined charge of howling Celtic warriors." (Mathisen, 88).
It took Rome 40 years to rebuild the power they had possessed prior to the sack, and the attitude of the Romans had been firmly cemented and would snowball into every interaction they had with neighbouring powers.
"The Gallic sack engendered in the Romans a virtually paranoid fear of strong neighbours." (Mathisen, pg. 105)
Due to this lingering trauma, they employed the tactic of "defensive imperialism", or pre-emptive strikes to keep the surrounding territories weak. The Roman switch into defensive mode is seen even in their building of the Servian wall, a direct response to the sack.
They did not seek to destroy other groups, but instead aimed at keeping them in a weak state; keeping their neighbours alive was more useful to them as with allies, they were stronger. The only time the Romans razed places to the ground was to prevent enemies from benefiting, as in the case of Carthage and Spain. If annihilation had been their aim, they would not have had nearly as many wars as they had, nor extended citizenship and/or treaties once enemies had been defeated. They were simply afraid of a repeat of the Gallic sack, and therefore took every precaution to ensure it didn't happen again. Additionally, one cannot make slaves of the dead. Therefore, it was in the interest of the Romans to not kill their enemies; they could either make friends, or make slaves, and it was a win for them either way even if the latter is a terrible prospect.
There were many reasons the Romans engaged in warfare, far beyond the realm of defence, such as for logistical reasons and for military praise, but I would argue the main reason for military action, at least on a subconscious level, was to ensure they were never seen as vulnerable or out of control. If a neighbour got too powerful and got no attention from the Romans, the enemy could quickly gain allies. When Rome went on campaigns, their presence was seen by everyone, and their strength was consistently put on display. Even if consuls—and later, emperors—went on a campaign for personal reasons, the expeditions themselves served many ends, and in a way, seeking glory for selfish reasons (when victorious) was a good thing. Ambition had a way of strengthening the image of Rome. Defeats were a bit more complicated, but due to Rome's unwavering dedication to success and control, defeats did not keep them down for long, and they emerged on the top in the face of constant adversaries.
Due to the fact that Rome just wanted to dominate neighbouring territory, not destroy it, they fought resurgence wars with the same groups as time and time again people rose up against the subjugation. As an example, there were three Samnite wars. The first Samnite war, 343-341 BCE is a result of Samnite expansions. (Mathisen, 106) The second Samnite war, 326-304 BCE, is because the Samnites broke a treaty. The third Samnite war, 298-290 BCE, is caused by an Italian Coalition against Rome, a mix of Samnites, Etruscans, and Gauls. The end result was nearly a Roman defeat until one of the Consuls sacrificed himself to aid in victory, which was obtained. These wars demonstrate how patient Rome was as well as how dedicated they were to their own cause. It would have been much easier to squash the buzzing fly, but the Romans half-heartedly waved it away instead.
Another example would be of Carthage and the Punic Wars. The Punic Wars are also distinguished, in part because Carthaginians were a naval power, but also because they were the one enemy Rome wiped off the map. Carthage was a very strong neighbour, and although they were tentative allies, tensions rose too high. The first Punic war was technically not started by either party, but both were dragged to the table by respective allies on either side, and it became a generation-long battle (Mulligan, 25-26). Rome's willingness to accept losses proved an asset in this war; they were not at all known for their naval prowess, but this did not stop their attempt at building a fleet of their own (Mathisen, 111). Hannibal, in the Second Punic War (218-201 BCE) proved to be the worthiest opponent the Romans ever faced, and time and time again, the Romans suffered defeat at his hands. The Romans underestimated Hannibal at every turn, and as a direct result, Hannibal was victorious even when—from a strategic standpoint—he really shouldn't have been successful.
"In quick succession, Hannibal inflicted two crushing defeats on a stunned and unprepared Rome." (Mulligan, 31)
For whatever reason, whether it was because of the Roman ego in warfare, if it was because of Hannibal's newness to militia, or straight up prejudice against Carthaginians, the Romans did not take him seriously, and each time, Hannibal turned it into a weapon. Only at the last second did the Romans manage to turn the table.
"Carthage never again would be a strong military power. (...) The Romans later looked back to their victory over the terrifying Hannibal as their defining moment, and they never forgot it." (Mathisen, 115)
"In these campaigns, the Romans often prevailed primarily because of their persistence, their willingness to suffer great losses and their ability to create long-term strategies for defeating enemies by constructing roads and military colonies." (Mathisen, 109)
Rome's willingness to suffer great losses, as mentioned in the quote above, is no doubt in part because their military was "funded" by non-romans. When other groups were brought into the fold, Rome gained access to new military support, and so it was less detrimental to Rome itself to send out campaigns as they were not all their own people. Had Rome been required to rely solely on their own numbers, they would not likely have remained a powerhouse. The Roman's constant victory, particularly over Hannibal, would have done nothing to lessen their ego and sense of self-importance.
The conquered were simply a means to an end, useful in the meantime, but replaceable. The enemies had more to lose in the sense that it was their own at risk and they were fighting for a personal cause, not simply borrowing credit from lenders like the Romans were. Rome's "non-Roman" military force was likely not loyal beyond what was necessary, particularly in times when payment was an issue or less than fair, unless actively recognized and worked on. In a sense, a portion of Rome's forces were simply mercenaries, and if one doesn't care about their military beyond the success and the statistics of it all, loyalty can be a very difficult thing to foster. It is for this reason it became a job of the Emperor, as seen in "Hadrian Inspects the Troops" (The Lambaesis Inscription, Mathisen, 328) to cultivate and nurture those in the military to inspire loyalty through good treatment and acknowledgement from the face of the empire. Those treated well, those encouraged by the emperor himself would fight with honor and loyalty for Rome. Without this in mind, it is very easy to send armies away with an "at whatever cost" mindset, especially if replenishment can be found elsewhere in the next successful conquest. It's a self-fed system, and the value of life is severely diminished and cheapened, even if it is not intended when people are used as a means to an end.
Those to the North were looked down upon, something that maintained all throughout Rome from its beginning to its end, which ironically start and end with a Gallic sack. Rome's obvious distaste and constant mistreatment and neglect of the Northern groups when they became provinces did not help matters, nor did it promote companionship, something that was extended to many others. Though I do not believe the neglect and disorganization was intentional, the rapid expansion—again, fuelled by fear of stronger opponents—meant there was no way to keep up with logistical things, such as, say, governing and the result was a chaotic mishmash of unenforced rule. Prominent Roman figures did not hide their distaste for the "Barbarians". Ovid, a prolific Roman poet, during his exile among the 'barbarians', states,
"Right forbids that anyone of Latin blood should suffer Barbarian bondage while Caesar lives." (Harrison, 320)
Further, he calls them a "cruel race", and describes them as having "harsh voices, grim faces, surest indication of their minds", which is incredibly racist and prejudiced. (Harrison, 320) In Caesar's Bellum Gallicum, books four and six, the way the Germanic people are described is to give a portrayal of "other" and less than, from diet and hunting practices to their nomadic lifestyle with the clear intention of making them seem primitive by comparison and beneath notice. (Allen-Hornblower, 684-685)
The Great Latin Revolt (340-338 BCE) began as a result of the Latins believing Rome went back on a treaty, thus a group rising up because of poor treatment. (Mathisen, 107) Here we see evidence of Romans not treating the groups around them as they ought to be treated, and instead seen as a means to an end, and no one likes feeling expendable. This, we shall see, is a recurring theme. The Latins were being drawn into military conflicts as supports but were not given much in return. The end result of the conflict resulted in the granting in citizenship (or at least partial citizenship), and the right to vote if in the city; the only right withheld was holding office, which was reserved for "true" Romans. This approach was entirely new, and it was wholly beneficial as its increased population, reduced enemies, and ensured they remained a powerful force. The slave revolts from around 135-71 BCE in particular demonstrate the Romans utter lack of care to those who they deem below them or unworthy; the conditions of the slaves were notoriously horrid, and it's a nasty side to Rome. (Mathisen, 172) It was only possible because of the exploitation of other humans and that cannot go unaddressed. The fact that it is a slave-owning culture shows that there is a disconnect with regard to respecting human life and corroborates the idea of a superiority complex.
The Romans appreciated civilizations that had a long history, likely another reason the Romans did not wish to destroy places and peoples, just the wish to rule over them. In a sense, by conquering and assimilating these groups, it was as though they were claiming that history too and enmeshing that history with their own, letting the history of others feed into their own self-importance because they conquered it. An example of this is the Greeks. The Romans clearly enjoyed what the Greeks and Etruscans brought to the table as we can see prominent echoes in philosophy, architecture, literature, and even the same Gods in the case of the Greeks, just renamed and adjusted slightly to better portray Roman ideals. And yet, even with the obvious appreciation of those surrounding the Romans, there is still a sense of a haughty disposition on the part of the Romans, a sense of entitlement and marking territory. It's very interesting to see how Rome interacts with these groups and on one hand, can appreciate and even admire aspects about the groups, but on the other hand still maintain a superiority complex and belittle with abuse, subjugation, and in many cases, slavery.
There is no question about the problematic nature of how Rome achieved what it did, but I want to acknowledge the cases of the Romans being incredibly tolerant, especially in the case of religion, though they get on the offensive when they feel their own ideals are being undermined, as seen by the Cult of Dionysus and early Christianity. (Mathisen, 137) Spiritual and religious beliefs that differed, such as Judaism, were given exemption from tribute because the Romans appreciated the history, and although that took a sour turn, it started off in a generally respectful place. They are the first civilization to offer citizenship; not even Greece, the birthplace of democracy, can boast that, which was a leading factor in their fall. They allowed groups into their protection and asked for aid in return, (which objectively is about as fair a transaction as one can get: "I give you, you give me") and they allowed people to generally do as they pleased as long as they followed the law "When in Rome, do as the Romans do".
The Romans take what they think is intelligent, innovative, or beautiful, claim it, and throw the remnants to the wayside to be lost. In short, they admire in others what they see in themselves and seem to shun anything that is not in line with Roman standard. So, as an example, Greek literature and Etruscan art gets a thumbs up, but "Germanic" dress and battle style is a thumbs down, seemingly on the basis of it being different. It's the "othering" of cultures that don't believe the same thing as you, the debasing of culture simply because it is not your own, which effectively boils down to racism, and the fear of the unknown and what is different, which is still, to this day, an important issue.
Romans mimicked Greek art, but there are notable differences: Greek motifs, while often portraying warriors and battle scenes, do not specifically portray their defeated enemies with severed heads, for instance. (De Souza, 31) The Greeks and Romans, while similar in certain aspects, are still different civilizations. The Romans did not fight for the sake of it; they fought to dominate, and this is evident in the fact that they have a Triumph, boasting of victory on the domination of others, often parading "spoils of war" and the incoming slaves that came with the victory. (De Souza, 39)
In conclusion, the relationship Rome had with its neighbours is a complicated one, and one that had deep-rooted fears. Notably, the Gallic sack of Rome in 390 BCE caused Rome to take a step back, and it shook them to their core, something I would argue they never truly got over. The event shaped every decision they made moving forward: defeat neighbours before they become a problem, assimilate or enslave them, and then draw on their population for military. This methodology was entirely new at this point in history, and it was what allowed them to thrive, but it cannot be forgotten that it was almost always at the expense of others. No accountability was taken on the part of the Romans and that should not be glorified.
[WORKS CITED]
Allen-Hornblower, Emily. "Beasts and Barbarians in Caesar's 'Bellum Gallicum' 6.21-8." The classical quarterly, vol. 64, no. 2, 2014, pp. 682–693. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/43905606. Accessed 10 Dec. 2020.
De Souza, Philip. "War, Slavery, and Empire in Roman Imperial Iconography." Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, vol. 54, no. 1, 2011, pp. 31– 62. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/43693967. Accessed 10 Dec. 2020.
Harrison, James R. "Paul's 'Indebtedness' to the Barbarian (Rom 1:14) in Latin West Perspective." Novum Testamentum, vol. 55, no. 4, 2013, pp. 311–348. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24735777. Accessed 10 Dec. 2020.
Mathisen, Ralph W. Ancient Roman Civilization: History and Sources, 753 BCE to 640 CE. Oxford University Press, 2019.
Mulligan, Bret. "Historical Context and Hannibal." Cornelius Nepos, life of Hannibal: Latin text, notes, maps, illustrations and vocabulary. 1st ed., vol. 1, open book publishers, 2015, pp. 21–42. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt17w8gvz.9. Accessed 10 Dec. 2020.